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Abstract 
 
There is an important literature on the causal relationship between the quality of 
institutions and macroeconomic performance. This paper studies this link at the micro 
level by looking at the productivity impacts of land rights. Whereas previous studies used 
proxies for soil quality and instruments to control for the endogeneity of land titles, the 
data used here include precise measures of soil quality, which allow controlling for both 
the heterogeneity between plots and the endogeneity of land titles. Results indicate that 
de jure rights (i.e., titles) have no impact on productivity and de facto rights have 
heterogeneous productivity impacts. Productivity is higher for plots on which landowners 
report having the right to plant trees, but lower for plots on which landowners report 
having the right to build a tomb and the right to lease out. Moreover, while the right to 
lease out increases both the likelihood that the landowner has the intention to seek a title 
for her plot and her willingness to pay to do so, whether her children will enjoy similar 
rights on the plot has the opposite effect. 
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1. Introduction 
In The Mystery of Capital, de Soto (2000) estimates that the poor in developing countries own 
about US$1 trillion worth of assets − a figure roughly comparable  to the 2008 gross domestic 
product of Australia or Mexico − but that the frequent lack of well -defined property rights in 
developing countries prevents the poor from capitalizing on those assets. 
 
Leaving aside the assumptions de Soto makes about the value of those assets and about the 
efficacy of the legal system in most developing countries (Woodruff, 2001), empirical studies by 
Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2005) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2005) have shown that institutions – 
property rights institutions in particular – have not only had long-term impacts on comparative 
economic development, they are the main cause of differences in economic performance 
between countries. 
 
Within countries, more specifically in developing-country agriculture, economists have 
theorized since the works of Feder and Noronha (1987), Feder and Feeny (1991), and Migot-
Adholla et al. (1991) that there are three causal mechanisms through which well-defined property 
rights can increase agricultural productivity − and thus the welfare of l andowners − within an 
effective legal system. First, property rights allow landowners to lease out or sell their plots of 
land to more productive individuals. Second, property rights give landowners stronger incentives 
to maintain and improve their plots. Third, property rights allow landowners to use their plots as 
collateral to obtain loans that can be used to finance investments in land or the purchase of 
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production inputs. In other words, clearly defined land rights should lead to productivity gains, 
everything else equal.1
 
 
As a result, land reform has been part of the development Zeitgeist for some time, although 
there is mounting evidence that such policies are more successful when they emerge 
endogenously instead of being imposed exogenously (Sikor and Müller, 2009), and the empirical 
evidence on the impact of land tenure on productivity is mitigated at best (Place, 2009). In 
several countries, a formal land title is often worth no more than the paper it is printed on, both 
because formal institutions are weak or nonexistent and because the transaction costs involved in 
defending one’s claim to a plot of land through the legal system are exceedingly high. 
 
This paper first looks at the effect of land rights in Madagascar by studying the agricultural 
productivity impacts of de jure land rights, captured here by whether a plot is titled, and of de 
facto land rights, captured here by whether the landowner believes she can lease the plot out; sell 
it; plant trees on it; or build a tomb on it; and by whether she believes her children will have the 
same rights as herself on the plot. In this paper, “de facto land rights” thus refer to the 
landowner’s subjective beliefs about whether she can do specific things on or with her plot of 
land.2
                                                 
1 Using data from Paraguay, Carter and Olinto (2003) disentangle the investment demand and credit supply effects 
of property rights reform and find that if the credit supply effect does not manage to relax credit constraints, 
landowners will substitute investment in fixed assets for investment in current (i.e., expropriation-immune) assets, 
with the result that the benefits of property rights reform largely accrue to wealthier landowners, who are less likely 
to be credit constrained. Likewise, Besley and Ghatak (2009) show that depending on the degree of competition in 
the credit market, it is in theory possible for some borrowers to be made worse off by property rights reform. The 
theoretical frameworks developed in both Carter and Olinto (2003) and Besley and Ghatak (2009) are both well 
beyond the scope of the data used in this paper. 
 
2 The survey questionnaire, however, failed to ask respondents about the origins of their subjective perceptions 
regarding de facto land rights. See Delavande et al. (2009) for an overview of the growing literature on the use of 
subjective perceptions or subjective expectations in development economics. 
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In Madagascar, however, formal land titles are known to have little to no impact on 
productivity and investment given the bankruptcy of land tenure institutions and the fact that 
most titles have not been kept up to date as land has been passed on from one generation to the 
next and broken up into smaller plots (Jacoby and Minten, 2007; Sandron, 2008). One of the 
goals of this paper is thus show how poorly those titles do in terms of improving agricultural 
productivity. Starting from empirical specifications that control only for de jure land rights (i.e., 
land titles), variables controlling for plot characteristics, soil quality, and de facto land rights are 
progressively added so as to determine whether land titles increase productivity once one 
controls for the various rights that typically come with a land title. In other words, the results in 
this paper says nothing about the impact of land titles on productivity in a context where land 
tenure institutions are well functioning and land titles have been kept up to date by landowners. 
Such contexts, however, are rare throughout the developing world. 
 
For robustness, this is estimated across four alternative definitions of de facto land rights: (i) 
disaggregated de facto land rights, i.e., including a dummy variable for each one of the 
aforementioned rights; (ii) use and transfer de facto land rights, i.e., including a dummy for 
whether the landowner has any use rights (the right to build a tomb and the right to plant trees) 
and a dummy for whether she has any transfer rights (the right to sell, whether the landowner’s 
children will have the same rights as the landowner on the plot, and the right to lease out); (iii) 
count of de facto land rights, i.e., a variable for the number of de facto land rights, as in Besley 
(1995); and (iv) whether the landowner has any de facto land rights, i.e., a dummy for whether 
the count of de facto land rights is different from zero. 
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Although Jacoby and Minten (2007) have previously studied the impact of land rights in 
Madagascar and have found that land titles have little to no impact on productivity, the data used 
in this paper allow building upon their results to go one step further as far as the identification of 
the impact of land rights on agricultural productivity goes. Indeed, the data include several plots 
per household, which allows controlling for the unobserved heterogeneity between households. 
More importantly, the data used in this paper include precise soil quality measurements (i.e., 
carbon, nitrogen, and potassium percentages; soil pH; and clay, silt, and sand content) for each 
plot, which allows one to effectively control for the unobserved heterogeneity between plots 
instead of having to rely on rough proxies for soil quality to do so.3
 
  
This paper’s contribution to the literature is thus twofold. First, it improves upon the usual 
identification of the impact of land rights. Second, and more importantly, it looks at whether 
property rights writ large indeed have salutary effects on productivity and incomes (as in 
Acemoglu et al., 2005 albeit at a considerably more micro level) by peeking into the “black box” 
within the specific context of a poor sub-Saharan African country. 
 
While similar studies usually focus on the impact of property rights on investment in land, 
the data used here do not include information on long-term investments (e.g., tree planting, as in 
Deininger and Jin, 2003 or Dercon and Ayalew, 2007). Although the data do include information 
on five different short-term investments, these investments were made in too few cases to allow 
using them as outcomes. Landowners reported having applied manure on their plots in 21 
                                                 
3 The data used by Goldstein and Udry (2008) include measures of soil pH and organic matter, but the focus of their 
paper is on the relationship between the property rights and political power of landowners. 
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percent of cases; urea in less than 1 percent of cases; NPK and pesticides in 3 percent of cases; 
and having treated their seeds in a little over 1 percent of cases. Consequently, and because land 
rights should in principle have unambiguously positive effects on agricultural productivity, this 
paper relies on a reduced form approach by directly looking at the impact of property rights on 
agricultural productivity rather than looking at the impact of property rights on investment and 
then the impact of investment on productivity.4
 
 Additionally, for untitled plots, this paper also 
estimates the determinants of whether landowners intend to title the plot as well as the 
determinants of their willingness to pay (WTP) to title the plot. So while the data used in this 
paper are cross-sectional, the availability of variables measuring landowners’ intent as well as 
their WTP to title their plots provide some insight about the dynamics of land titling. 
The empirical results indicate that de jure land rights (i.e., land titles) have no significant 
impact on productivity, a result that is robust across all four definitions of de facto land rights 
used to check the robustness of the results. Moreover, de facto land rights significantly affect 
productivity: the right to plant trees increase productivity by about 7 percent, while the rights to 
build a tomb on the plot and the right to lease it out decrease productivity by 7.5 and 6.5 percent. 
That the right to build a tomb on the plot decreases productivity suggests that specific taboos 
(Ruud, 1960) or cultural mores (Graeber, 1995) might play an important role in constraining 
productivity (Stifel et al., 2008) on the plots on which one can build a tomb. Likewise, that the 
right to lease a plot out decreases productivity is consistent with the empirical evidence 
associating land leases with a considerable amount of tenurial insecurity in Madagascar (Blanc-
Pamard and Rakoto Ramiarantsoa, 2000; Sandron, 2008; Bellemare, 2009). Indeed, the right to 
                                                 
4 For completeness, estimation results are also presented for the determinants of the landowner’s subjective 
assessment of value of the plot. 
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lease out also increases both the likelihood that the landowner will intend to obtain a title for the 
plot as well as her WTP to title it, but whether a landowner’s children will have the same rights 
as the landowner on the plot decreases both the likelihood that the landowner will intend to 
obtain a title for the plot as well as her WTP to title it. Finally, neither de jure nor de facto land 
rights have any impact on the landowner’s subjective assessment of the value of her plot. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. To facilitate the interpretation of the 
empirical results and to show how widespread the knowledge that land titles are ineffective in 
this context is, section 2 offers a discussion of land titles, land rights, and land tenure institutions 
in Madagascar. In section 3, the equations to be estimated are presented, and the way in which 
the impact of land rights on productivity is identified is discussed at length. Section 4 presents 
the data, paying particular attention to the soil quality measurements that allow controlling for 
the unobserved heterogeneity between plots and the inclusion of which constitute one of the 
innovations in this paper. In section 5, empirical results are presented for agricultural 
productivity along with a number of robustness checks as well as for the landowner’s intention to 
title the plot, her WTP to title the plot, and her subjective assessment of the value of the plot. 
Section 6 concludes by discussing the policy significance of the empirical results. 
 
2. Land Titles, Land Rights, and Land Tenure Institutions in Madagascar 
The state of affairs as regards land tenure in Madagascar is best described by the Lettre de 
politique foncière, a document summarizing the proceedings of a workshop on land tenure 
organized by the Ministry of Agriculture in early 2005.5
                                                 
5 Most of the information in this section is discussed at length in an edited volume by Sandron (2008). 
 The Lettre de politique foncière 
stemmed directly from the objectives delineated in Madagascar’s Poverty Reduction Strategy 
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Paper and as such, the Lettre was written in order to describe the situation on the ground and 
clearly define priorities for policy makers. 
 
The Lettre de politique foncière describes how customary rights have gradually receded since 
Malagasy independence in 1960 as land has increasingly become a traded asset. As a result, 
landowners have been increasingly turning to the state to define their property rights. Because 
untitled and uncultivated lands officially belong to the state, half a million requests to obtain 
government lands are pending (Bertrand et al., 2008). Land titling, however, has been and is still 
proceeding at a snail’s pace: a total of 330,000 titles have been delivered over the last century, 
and only about 1,000 new titles are delivered annually. Some requests for land titles have been 
pending for several decades (Teyssier et al., 2008), and as plots are passed on from one 
generation to the next and broken up into smaller plots through bequests, formal land titles fall 
into obsolescence due to the prohibitive costs to the landowners of keeping them up to date. 
 
Worse, the government agency in charge of land tenure is overwhelmed. The buildings in 
which titling records are held are often in an advanced state of decay, which makes record 
keeping a heroic endeavor as some records have already been irreversibly damaged. The 
government employees in charge of the administration of lands face difficult working conditions 
and often have to bring their own materials to work. The Lettre de politique foncière concludes 
that the land titling system is bankrupt and that many landowners feel tenurial insecurity on their 
own lands. Furthermore, land conflicts occur frequently, acquiring a land title is practically 
impossible without bribing the relevant authority figures, and landowners have little to no 
incentive to invest in their own plots (Dabat and Razafindraibe, 2008). 
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Among the causes identified by the Lettre de politique foncière for this situation are (i) a lack 
of legal knowledge among landowners; (ii) the complexity, length of time, and costliness of the 
procedure leading up to the acquisition of a land title (Teyssier et al., 2008); (iii) the lack of 
funds allocated to the management of lands at the local level; (iv) the centralization of land 
administration; and (v) the lack of intermediaries between the central government and 
smallholders. 
 
Small landowners have been responsive, however, and many have chosen to “opt out” of the 
legal system (Bernstein, 1992) by putting in place their own informal system of land titles, called 
petits papiers (small papers; see Jacoby and Minten, 2007 for a discussion). Under this system, 
which has burgeoned all over the country even in the absence of a coordinated effort, informal 
land titles are officialized at the community level, and many land sales are accompanied by a 
petit papier. Because they are informal, however, these documents are only valid within the 
community and do not protect landowners against the possibility of adverse possession from 
outside the community (Baker et al., 2001).6
 
 
As a consequence of the Lettre de politique foncière, important efforts have been made since 
2005 to reform land tenure institutions in Madagascar. Generally speaking, the objective of these 
reforms has been a greater recognition of untitled private property. In 2005, the management of 
lands was decentralized at the commune level, and the ownership of untitled private property 
was legally recognized (Republic of Madagascar, 2005). In 2006, a law and subsequent 
                                                 
6 Both the bankruptcy of the formal titling system and the emergence of the petits papiers system in Madagascar 
offer evidence against the evolutionary theory of land rights, a critique of which can be found in Platteau (1996). 
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government decree have allowed communes to open a guichet foncier (land tenure office), where 
landowners could get certificates documenting their property rights on their plots and where an 
official map of the lands in the commune would be held (Republic of Madagascar, 2006). 
Further efforts have been made to map out and classify public lands as well as to define rights on 
these lands (Republic of Madagascar, 2008a and 2008b). As of writing this paper, it is unclear 
whether any of these provisions − which were adopted under the government of Marc 
Ravalomanana and officially remain in place − will be applied given the March 2009 coup 
d’état, which saw Andry Rajoelina seize power. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
Because the contribution of this paper derives from the way it identifies the impact of land rights, 
this section first presents the equations to be estimated as well as the identification strategy for 
agricultural productivity. It then does the same for the landowner’s intent and WTP to title the 
plot, albeit in more succinct fashion given that much of the discussion remains unchanged. 
 
3.1. Agricultural Productivity: Estimation Strategy 
The first equation to be estimated is such that  
 
       (1) 
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where  is the yield (i.e., output per unit of land) on plot i belonging to household j in village k;7
 
 
 is a variable equal to one if the plot is titled and equal to zero otherwise; is a vector of 
household fixed effects; and  is an error term with mean zero. In every estimated equation in 
this paper, the vector of  household fixed effects is included to account for the heterogeneity of 
preferences, endowments, ability levels, etc. between landowners (i.e., the unobserved 
heterogeneity between households). Because households do not move from one village to the 
other within the cross-sectional data used in this paper, these fixed effects also account for the 
heterogeneity of customary rights and institutions at the level of the community (i.e., the 
unobserved heterogeneity between villages). 
To begin controlling for the heterogeneity between plots, the next equation to be estimated 
augments equation 1 by including a vector  of plot characteristics (e.g., cultivated area; whether 
the plot suffered from crop disease; distance from the landowner’s dwelling; soil color; position 
on the toposequence; and source of irrigation), such that 
 
      (2) 
 
The specification in equation 2, while it controls for the observable heterogeneity between 
plots, fails to account for the unobservable heterogeneity between plots. The next equation thus 
augments equation 2 by including a vector  of soil quality measurements,8
                                                 
7 Because rice is the staple crop in Madagascar, data collection focused on rice agriculture, and so this paper focuses 
only on rice productivity. See section 4 below for a more detailed discussion of the data. 
 such that 
8 As in Barrett et al. (2010), the soil quality measurements are treated here as inputs in the production process. 
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    (3) 
 
To begin controlling for de facto land rights, the next equation augments equation 3 by 
including a vector  of de facto land rights while temporarily omitting the vector  of soil quality 
measurements, such that 
 
     (4) 
 
The next equation, which presents the most complete specification of the equation to be 
estimated in this paper, takes equation 4 and augments it with the vector  of soil quality 
measurements, such that 
 
   (5) 
 
Although the specification in equation 5 in principle eliminates the endogeneity of land titles 
(see section 3.2 below), a sixth specification is estimated to make the results in this paper 
comparable with previous studies. In this last specification, the dummy variable  for whether the 
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plot is titled is instrumented and thus replaced by its predicted value from a first-stage 
instrumenting regressions, and the soil quality measurements are omitted, such that 
 
     (6) 
 
Along with other identification considerations, the next sub-section discusses the instrument used 
in this specification. 
 
3.2. Agricultural Productivity: Identification Strategy 
It is helpful to start discussing identification with a description of what the ideal data set would 
look like, which will serve as a benchmark against which to compare the data used in this paper. 
 
Short of a randomized control trial in which the treatment consists in titling randomly-
selected plots and testing whether productivity is higher in the treatment group than in the 
control group (see Duflo et al., 2008 for a general exposition), the ideal data set in this context 
would include repeated observations on the plots belonging to households across several 
villages. In terms of variables, that data set would include time-varying plot-level information on 
production (i.e.,  above), soil quality (i.e.,  above), and the characteristics of the plot (i.e.,  
above) within each household, and it would also include time-varying information on de jure 
land rights (i.e., titling status, or  above) and de facto land rights (i.e.,  above) within a 
significant number of households. Using that ideal data set, it would be possible to study the 
dynamic effects of land rights on agricultural productivity while controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity between plots, households, and villages. 
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Compared with that idealized benchmark, the data used in this paper are cross-sectional, and 
so they do not allow studying the dynamic relationship between land rights and agricultural 
productivity. Unfortunately, the author knows of no longitudinal data set that includes 
information on production, plot characteristics, and soil quality measurements. More 
importantly, even if such a data set were available, it is unlikely that there would be much 
variation within each household in de jure land rights over time (especially in this context, where 
the government emits only about 1,000 new titles annually). It is even more unlikely that there 
would be much variation within each household in de facto land rights over time, given how 
beliefs about what one can and cannot do on or with one’s plots take a long time to form and are 
unlikely to change much once they are formed. 
 
How is the impact of land rights on agricultural productivity identified in these data? Because 
both productivity and land rights vary between plots within each household, absent any 
correlation between the regressors and the error term, the coefficient vector  in equation 5 
directly measures the impact of land rights on productivity. It is usually not the case, however, 
that the regressors and the error term are uncorrelated. Following Besley (1995), it could be that 
the plots in a given village are more likely to be titled than in other villages. For example, the 
institutions in a given village could be such that a land title would bring nothing more than what 
the village elders can grant a landowner. Or it could be that the landowners who seek titles differ 
in systematic ways from those who do not. For example, they could be wealthier, better 
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educated, have a better knowledge of the legal system, and so on. In such cases, the inclusion of 
household fixed effects allows controlling for the endogeneity of land titles.9
 
 
It could also be, however, that the plots whose landowners seek titles differ systematically 
from those whose landowners do not. For instance, they could have better irrigation, lower 
carbon content, a more acidic soil, and so on. In this case, the best one can do is to include as 
many controls as possible. In this paper, these controls include a vector of soil quality 
measurements; the size of the area cultivated on the plot; a dummy variable for whether the plot 
suffered from a crop disease during the last season; the distance between the landowner’s 
dwelling and the plot; controls for the color of the soil; controls for the plot’s position on the 
toposequence; and controls for the plot’s source of irrigation. 
 
Even though the inclusion of soil quality measurements in principle allows one to identify the 
impact of land rights on productivity, this paper also presents the results of the instrumental 
variable (IV) specification in equation 6 for comparability with previous studies. To do so, the 
empirical strategy found in Besley (1995) and Brasselle et al. (2002) is adapted to this context, 
and the dummy for whether the plot is formally titled is instrumented with a dummy for whether 
the plot was inherited or received as a gift. The identifying assumption in this case is thus that 
the way in which a plot came to be owned by an individual landowner has no impact on how 
productive the plot is, given all the plot-level controls included in equation 2, but that it has an 
impact on whether the landowner seeks a title. On the one hand, even if a plot’s mode of 
acquisition impacts unobservable soil quality or observable characteristics, this is controlled for 
                                                 
9 In contrast with Burkina Faso, where different individuals within a household own different plots (Udry, 1996), in 
Madagascar the household head is the de facto owner of all the plots owned by the household. 
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by the inclusion of soil quality measurements and other observable plot characteristics in the 
productivity equation. The longer a plot has been owned by the landowner’s family, on the other 
hand, the more likely it is to be accompanied by a title that is easily transferable to the landowner 
relative to plots that have been purchased from strangers or cleared by the landowner. Again, this 
is not the ideal instrument, but it is included here to make the results comparable with those of 
previous studies. 
 
3.3. Intent and Willingness to Pay to Title: Estimation and Identification Strategies 
Because landowners were asked both whether they intended to title the plot in the future and 
what their WTP was to do so, this paper also studies the determinants of a landowner’s stated 
intent and stated WTP to title the plot. In the first case, the equation to be estimated is such that 
 
     (7)  
 
where  is a dummy variable equal to one if the landowner intends to title the plot and equal 
to zero otherwise; is a vector of de facto land rights;  is a vector of observable plot 
characteristics;  is again a vector of soil quality measurements;  is a vector of household fixed 
effects; and  is an error term with mean zero. 
 
Likewise, in the second case, the equation to be estimated is such that 
 
   (7) 
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where  is the landowner’s WTP to title the plot per unit of land, which is regressed on the same 
variables as in the case of the landowner’s intent to title the plot.10
 
 In both cases, the 
identification strategy is the same as in the case of agricultural productivity save for the 
discussion of the endogeneity of titles, which is not relevant to this part of the paper given that it 
only considers the subsample of untitled plots. 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper were collected in 2002 under the US Agency for International 
Development’s BASIS Collaborative Research Support Program. A total of 516 plots belonging 
to 300 randomly selected households in 17 randomly selected villages were surveyed in the 
central highlands of Madagascar. Because rice is the staple crop in Madagascar, the survey 
focused on rice agriculture, and so this paper focuses on rice productivity. Because of missing 
values, and to concentrate on the plots for which output has been strictly positive, the analysis 
retains a total of 473 plots belonging to 290 households for analysis. 
 
The average household in the sample owned 1.6 plots, so a significant number of the 
households in our data (i.e., 169 households out of 290) owned only one plot. Although it may 
seem a priori as though this would introduce selection bias in the analysis below by dropping 
one-plot households in a nonrandom fashion, the inclusion of household fixed effects allows 
controlling for the difference in the number of plots per household (Verbeek and Nijman, 
                                                 
10 As in MaCurdy and Pencavel (1986), 0.001 was added to WTP per are before taking the logarithm so as to not 
drop the observations for which WTP was equal to zero (i.e., the plots which the landowner had no intention of 
titling) in a nonrandom fashion. 
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1992).11
 
 Because of the sampling scheme, standard errors are clustered at the village level 
throughout the remainder of this paper unless otherwise noted. 
The unique feature of these data is that five soil cores were extracted in random locations 
from each selected plot of a sub-sample of rice plots and sent to the World Agroforestry Centre 
in Nairobi for wet chemistry and spectral analysis. In total, samples soil cores were extracted 
from rice plots belonging to 300 households. All the soil cores underwent spectral analysis, but 
because wet chemistry is both costly and destructive, a sub-sample of 234 soil cores went 
through wet chemistry analysis, which allows precisely measuring a soil sample’s carbon, 
nitrogen, and potassium contents; its pH level; as well as its clay, silt, and sand percentages. The 
results of the wet chemistry analysis were then used as dependent variables in imputing 
regressions that relied on principal components scores derived from a spectral analysis of the full 
sample as their independent variables. This ultimately allowed imputing precise soil quality 
measurements for the entire sample of plots. Appendix table A1 shows that the adjusted  
measures were above 0.85 in five of the seven imputing regressions. See Shepherd and Walsh 
(2002) for a validation of this method, and Barrett at al. (2010) for a detailed description of the 
soil analysis protocol. Because the soil quality measurements are generated regressors, standard 
errors are bootstrapped throughout the remainder of this paper unless otherwise noted. 
 
                                                 
11 Household fixed effects, however, cannot control for the potential substitution effects between plots, which 
depend on the number of plots a household owns and may entail a breakdown of the stable unit treatment value 
assumption (SUTVA, see Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). That is, a landowner who owns two plots faces a resource 
allocation problem that a landowner who owns only one plot does not have to worry about. In this paper, the 
SUTVA is justified by the inclusion of an extensive set of plot characteristics and soil quality measurements, which 
controls for the unobserved heterogeneity between plots. 
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Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the variables in this paper. The yield on the average 
plot was equal to 37 kilograms of rice per are,12 or 3.7 metric tons of rice per hectare, the 
production of which required on average 16 ares of land. This rice was produced on plots which 
on average contained 2.4 percent carbon, 0.2 percent nitrogen, and 0.2 percent potassium; had a 
soil pH of about 5.1;13
 
 and contained 28.2 percent clay, 26.4 percent silt, and 45.1 percent sand. 
Roughly one in five plots was stricken by crop disease during the last production season, and 
the average plot was located about ten minutes from the landowner’s house. The soil was 
predominantly black in 51 percent of cases, red in 18 percent of cases, and either brown or white 
in 31 percent of cases. The vast majority (62 percent) of plots are lowland rice plots while most 
of the remainder (38 percent) were hillside plots, with only very few plots (2 percent) located on 
hilltops. Finally, 45 percent of plots are irrigated by a dam, 37 percent are irrigated by a spring, 
and only 15 percent are irrigated by rainfall. 
 
As regards de facto land rights, landowners report perceiving that they have the right to sell 
on 56.4 percent of the plots; the right to build a tomb on 15.2 percent of the plots; the right to 
lease out on 72.3 percent of the plots; the right to plant trees on 51.6 percent of the plots; and 
they report perceiving that their children will have the same rights as themselves on 46 percent of 
the plots. Although respondents were given, for each de facto right question, the opportunity to 
respond that they did not know whether they had that right along with the usual “yes” and “no” 
options, no respondent effectively chose that answer for any de facto right. Almost a third (32.3 
percent) of all plots in the sample are titled (i.e., landowners have de jure rights to them), which 
                                                 
12 One hectare is equal to 100 ares, and one are is equal to 100 square meters. 
13 Given that distilled water has a (neutral) pH of 7, this denotes a relatively high level of soil acidity in the sample. 
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is close to the national average of 28 percent. Moreover, almost two thirds (64.3 percent) of the 
plots were inherited, a little under a third (31.9 percent) were purchased, and few of them were 
either received as a gift (0.6 percent) or cleared by the landowner (2.3 percent). Finally, the 
landowner intends to seek a title for almost half of the plots in the sub-sample of untitled plots 
and would be willing to pay about US$2.87 per are to do so,14
 
 or about US$47 in total for the 
average plot. Lastly, the average plot was worth US$170 to its landowner. 
5. Estimation Results and Discussion 
Before proceeding with the econometric analysis of the impact of land rights on productivity, it 
may be instructive to simply look at the unconditional impact of land titles on various indicators. 
Figure 1 therefore shows kernel density estimations of rice yield for titled and untitled plots, both 
estimated with the Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth set to 15 kg of rice per are. Although 
the distribution of rice yields for titled plots appears tighter around its mean than the distribution 
of rice yields for untitled plots, the mean yields of titled and untitled plots do not appear to differ 
significantly from one another. 
 
Table 2 goes one step further by splitting the sample along de jure land rights – i.e., titled and 
untitled plots − and reporting descriptive statistics for each de facto land right (i.e., right to sell; 
whether the landowner’s children will have the same rights on the plot; right to build a tomb; 
right to lease the plot out; and right to plant trees); for dummies for whether the landowner has 
any use rights (defined here as the right to build a tomb and the right to plant trees) or any 
transfer rights (defined here as the right to sell, whether the landowner’s children will have the 
same rights on the plot, and the right to lease out); for a count of de facto land rights; as well as 
                                                 
14 At the time of the survey, US$1 ≈ 300 Ariary.  
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for a dummy for whether the landowner has any right (i.e., whether the count of rights is 
nonzero) on the plot. Table 2 also reports descriptive statistics by titling status for how the plot 
was acquired as well as for the mean and variance of rice yields. 
 
Although one would expect owners of titled plots to have more de facto land rights on their 
plot than owners of untitled plots, the results in the first part of table 2 indicate otherwise. 
Indeed, although the fact that a landowner’s children will have similar rights as herself on the 
plot is significantly more prevalent on titled plots, the right to sell and the right to build a tomb 
are both significantly more prevalent on untitled plots. Use and transfer rights are both more 
prevalent on titled rather than untitled plots, although this is only significant in the case of 
transfer rights. And while there is no significant difference in the number of de facto rights 
between titled and untitled plots, the proportion of landowners who have any right on their plot is 
significantly higher on titled plots than on untitled plots. Moreover, both inherited plots and the 
plots received as gifts are more likely to be titled, but purchased plots are more likely to be 
untitled. These results, which are a prima facie puzzling, are most likely due to the fact that 
many land titles have not been kept up to date, and so they fail to give rights to the landowners. 
 
As foretold by figure 1, there is no significant difference in mean rice yield between titled 
and untitled plots. The difference, however, is economically significant in that titled plots are 8 
percent less productive than untitled plots. Interestingly, the variance of rice yields (i.e., the 
square of the average distance from the mean) is significantly lower on titled plots than on 
untitled plots. 
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These comparisons between titled and untitled plots, however, are rather crude as they cannot 
control for a number of confounding factors. The sections that follow address this problem by 
systematically studying the impact of de jure and de facto land rights on productivity, the 
determinants of a landowner’s intent and WTP to title her plot, as well as the determinants of a 
landowner’s subjective assessment of the value of her plot; and by conducting a number of 
robustness checks on the results. 
 
5.1. Productivity Impacts of Land Rights 
Table 3 presents estimation results for the productivity equations in six columns. For ease of 
interpretation, column numbers coincide with to equation numbers in section 3.  
 
As discussed elsewhere (Barrett et al., 2010), there exists a significant inverse relationship 
between plot size and productivity in these data as doubling the size of the average plot would 
lead to a decrease in yield of about 22 percent, a result that is consistent across all specification 
of the productivity equation save for equation 1 in the first column, where cultivated area is 
excluded from the regressors.  
 
Soil color, for its part, only matters in the most complete specification, i.e., that in equation 5, 
which controls for the unobserved heterogeneity between villages, households, and plots and 
which includes both de jure and de facto rights. In that case, a plot whose soil is predominantly 
brown or white is significantly more productive than plots whose soil is black, the omitted 
category. Thus, comparing the estimation results for equations 4 and 5, note that the inclusion of 
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soil quality measurements makes soil color go from having no significant impact on yield to 
having a significant impact. 
 
A similar effect is observed for a plot’s source of irrigation, which is not significant in 
equation 4. In equation 5, however, plots irrigated by dams are significantly more productive 
than plots irrigated by rain, the omitted category. Moreover, soil quality measurements have a 
significant impact on productivity in that both a plot’s soil pH and its potassium content have a 
negative impact on its productivity in equation 5.15
 
 
Turning to de facto land rights, in both equations 4 and 5, the right to plant trees increases 
productivity by 6.9 percent in equation 4 and by 7.1 percent in equation, and the right to lease the 
plot out decreases productivity by 6.8 percent in equation 4 and by 6.5 percent in equation 5. The 
former effect is consistent with the hypothesis according to which tree planting is associated with 
increased productivity levels, and the latter effect is consistent with the literature associating land 
leases with a considerable amount of tenurial insecurity in Madagascar (Blanc-Pamard and 
Rakoto Ramiarantsoa, 2000; Sandron, 2008; Bellemare, 2009).  
 
When including soil quality measurements (i.e., when going from equation 4 to equation 5), 
the right to build a tomb goes from insignificant to significant and entails a 7.5 percent decrease 
in productivity in the most complete specification of the productivity equation. It may seem 
puzzling that the right to build a tomb would entail a loss of productivity given that there is no a 
                                                 
15 One should be careful not to give soil quality measurements a structural interpretation, given that these variables 
are included here as control variables. Ideally, one would include each input (including soil quality measurements) 
along with its square and its interactions with other inputs. Given the sample size, however, it was not possible to do 
so in this case. Thus, although one would for instance expect a nonlinear structural relationship between yield and 
soil pH, this variable enters equations 3, 5, and 6 only linearly because of the role of soil pH as a control variable. 
24 
 
priori reason why this should be the case. In this context, however, it is likely that plots on which 
one can build a tomb belong to the clan and cannot truly become private property, which 
decreases one’s incentives to invest in them. Alternatively, given the multiplicity of prohibitions 
and taboos observed in Madagascar, it is also likely that the right to build a tomb is associated 
with a number of productivity-reducing taboos (Ruud, 1960).16
 
 Likewise, because the Malagasy 
regularly organize two- to three-day extended family reunions called famadihana (turning of the 
bones) during which they take the bodies of the ancestors out of the family tomb and wrap them 
in fresh shrouds as part of the cult of the ancestors (Graeber, 1995), and because these 
ceremonies tend to be destructive of the soil around a tomb, it is not unlikely that landowners 
who expect to build tombs on their plots simply do not make productivity-enhancing investments 
on the same plots.  
To investigate this result further, an alternative specification (not shown) of the productivity 
equation was estimated in which equation 5 was augmented with the interaction between the 
number of people over the age of 65 in the household and the dummy for whether the landowner 
had the right to build a tomb on the plot. In that alternative specification (i) the interaction 
between the number of elderly individuals within the household and the dummy for whether the 
landowner can build a tomb had a significant negative impact on productivity; and (ii) the 
dummy for whether the landowner can build a tomb no longer had a significant impact on 
productivity. Given that life expectancy is a little under 63 years in Madagascar, this suggests 
that landowners who expect to have to build a tomb on their plot soon are less likely to have 
recently made productivity-increasing investments on their plots. 
                                                 
16 For instance Stifel et al. (2008) find that the number of days for which agricultural work is prohibited has a 
negative impact on agricultural productivity. 
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Lastly, and of considerable importance for policy, land titles have no statistically significant 
impact on productivity, a finding that is robust across all specifications in table 3. That de jure 
land rights (i.e., whether a plot is titled) have no impact on productivity is not surprising in this 
context given the background discussion in section 2, which explained how common it is for a 
title to not have been updated in a long time, in which case it confers little to no ownership 
advantage. In this context then, a de jure land right does not imply that one has any de facto 
rights on the plot. This is also not surprising in light of the mitigated empirical results discussed 
by Place (2009) on the productivity impacts of land titles.  
 
The fact the de jure land rights have no significant impact on productivity in this context 
echoes the conclusions of Atwood (1990) for Africa as well as of Jacoby and Minten (2007) for 
Madagascar. Lastly, this finding points to institutional failures at a level beyond that of the 
community, given that the results in this paper control for institutional differences between 
communities. 
 
A comparison of the estimation results for equations 5 and 6 also indicate that the method 
used in this paper to control for the unobserved heterogeneity between plots – and thus for the 
endogeneity of land titles – yields results that are very different from those obtained using the IV 
methodology found in some previous studies. Indeed, comparing the results in columns 5 and 6 
of table 3, one is struck by the fact that while one concludes that de facto land rights have a 
significant impact on productivity when controlling for the endogeneity of land titles by 
including soil quality measurements, one would conclude instead that they have no significant 
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impact on productivity when using an IV. This is not due to a weak instrument: the Cragg-
Donald test of the null hypothesis that the instrument is weak has an F-statistic equal to 11.18 
(see Stock and Yogo, 2002). Rather, this result suggests that the IV is not exogenous to yield in 
these data, which offers a cautionary tale against the use of this particular instrument to control 
for the endogeneity of land titles. 
 
5.2. Robustness Checks 
To make sure that the result that land titles have no significant impact on productivity is not due 
to the disaggregated nature of de facto land rights in table 3, but also to explore whether 
alternative definitions of de facto land rights may capture productivity impacts that are not 
captured in table 3, this section discusses robustness checks that were conducted with alternative 
definitions of de facto land rights.  
 
Because it was not possible in this case to rank all five de facto land rights in order of their 
strength, as in Brasselle et al. (2002), specifications 4 to 6 in table 3 were estimated instead with 
(i) a dummy variable for whether the landowner has any de facto use rights (i.e., the right to 
build a tomb or the right to plant trees) and a dummy variable for whether the landowner has any 
de facto transfer rights (i.e., the right to sell, whether the landowner’s children will have the same 
rights on the plot, or the right to lease out) in table 4; (ii) a count of the number of de facto land 
rights a landowner has on a given plot, as in Besley (1995) in table 5; and (iii) a dummy variable 
for whether the landowner has any de facto right in table 6. 
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The robustness checks in tables 4 to 6 indicate that no matter how one defines de facto 
property rights in this context, the finding that land titles have no impact on productivity 
remains, i.e., a landowner may have de jure land right in this context without that right 
conferring any productivity advantage. 
 
Likewise, de facto use rights have no impact on productivity except in the first column (i.e., 
the column labeled 4’) of table 4, where use rights increase productivity by 4 percent. Note, 
however, how the inclusion of soil quality measurements make the dummy for whether the 
landowner has any use rights drop out of significance in the second column (i.e., the column 
labeled 5’) of table 4. De facto transfer rights, for their part, have a negative impact on 
productivity throughout table 4, with productivity decreases of 5 percent, 4.4 percent, and 5 
percent. In light of the results in table 3, these results are hardly surprising. Indeed, the fact that a 
landowner’s use rights drop out of significance when including soil quality measurements likely 
captures the fact that in column 4 of table 3, the right to plant trees had a positive impact on 
productivity, but that both the right to plant trees and the right to build a tomb had significant 
impacts which almost exactly cancelled each other in column 5. Likewise, the fact that a 
landowner’s transfer rights has a consistent negative impact on productivity in table 4 captures 
the fact that in columns 4 and 5 of table 3, the right to lease out had a negative impact on 
productivity. The fact that transfer rights as a whole have a negative impact on productivity 
could be due to the considerable amount of asset risk involved with land tenancy, as discussed 
above, but because the variable of interest in this case is the sum of both the right to lease out 
and the right to sell, it could also capture the fact that forward-looking landowners seek to 
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preserve their plot’s fertility as in Dubois (2002) so as to be able to extract more surplus when 
leasing it out or selling it. Testing this hypothesis, however, is beyond the scope of the data. 
 
Regressing yield on a count of de facto land rights or a dummy for whether the landowner 
has any such rights yields no particular insight, as neither variable is significant in any of the 
specifications in tables 5 and 6. Given that these definitions assume that all de facto land right 
have homogeneous impacts on productivity, which tables 3 and 4 have shown to be false, this is 
unsurprising. 
 
How can de facto land rights have any impact on productivity given that the empirical results 
in equation 5 in tables 3 to 6 control for both soil quality and plot characteristics? Indeed, given 
that these variables should control for past investment behavior by the landlord, it looks as 
though de facto land rights may capture the effects of intrahousehold allocative inefficiency 
between plots which are not captured by the soil quality measurements or the plot characteristics 
included among the regressors in tables 3 to 6. One way around this might be to estimate 
production functions rather than the reduced form yield equations estimated in this paper. 
Indeed, when such production functions were estimated during preliminary work, the impact of 
de facto land rights was considerably attenuated both statistically and economically with respect 
to the empirical results in this paper. Given that production inputs are endogenous to yield, 
however, estimating production functions would bias the estimated coefficients. 
 
For completeness, the study of productivity is complemented by studying the empirical 
determinants of the landowner’s subjective assessment of the value of her plot (i.e., value per 
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are), as in Alston et al. (1996).17
 
 Table 7 presents estimation results for the empirical 
determinants of the per unit value of a plot. According to these empirical results, larger plots are 
worth comparatively less per are. Given that this controls for both observable (i.e., distance 
between the plot and the landowner’s house; soil color; position of the plot on the toposequence; 
source of irrigation) as well as unobservable (i.e., soil quality measurements) plot characteristics, 
this likely also reflects intrahousehold allocative inefficiency between plots which is not captured 
by the soil quality measurements or the plot characteristics included among the regressors in 
table 7. Alternatively, because the information contained in the vector of soil quality 
measurements is known to the econometrician but not to the landowners, this inverse relationship 
between plot size and the landowner’s subjective assessment of the value of her plot may capture 
a subjective perception that larger plots are of lesser quality among landowners.  
Unsurprisingly, plots located on hilltops and hillsides are worth significantly less than 
lowland plots, the omitted category. Given that de jure land rights have no impact on 
productivity, it is also not surprising that formally titled plots are worth no more to their owners 
than untitled plots. It is more surprising, however, that de facto land rights should have no impact 
on land value, seeing as to how they significantly affect productivity. When combined together, 
these findings suggest that while de facto land rights affect what the landowner does with her 
plot (i.e., the amount of effort exerted in cultivating it), they do not affect the value of the plot 
itself. 
 
5.3. Intent and Willingness to Pay to Title 
                                                 
17 Previous versions of this paper also included estimation results for the empirical determinants of the landlord’s 
investment in manure on the plot but were left out given that manure was applied in only 100 cases, none of the 
regressors included in table 7 had a significant impact on the quantity of manure applied per are on the plot. 
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Having determined the impacts of de jure and de facto land rights in these data, one can next turn 
to what determines a landowner’s intent to title a particular plot and what determines her WTP to 
do so. 
 
Table 8 presents estimation results for the determinants of a landowner’s intent to title a 
specific plot as well as her WTP to do so. Both the right to lease out and whether the 
landowner’s children will have the same rights on the plot have a significant impact on whether 
the landowner has the intention of seeking a title for her plot, but the impacts of these two 
variables are of opposite signs. Indeed, while the right to lease out increases the likelihood that 
the landowner will report having the intention to seek a title, whether her children will have the 
same rights on the plot decreases that likelihood.  
 
Likewise, for WTP, the findings are the same as in the case of the coarser intent to title. In 
other words, if a landowner believes that her descendants will have the same rights as herself on 
the plot, she will be both less likely to report having the intention to seek a title for the plot and 
she will be much less willing to pay to title the plot. This is likely because this right, because of 
its forward-looking and far-reaching nature, is a strong indicator that one’s property right is well 
established. Moreover, the landowner will exhibit a significantly higher WTP to title her plot if 
she has the right to lease it out, a result that is consistent with the literature associating land 
leases with a greater amount of tenurial insecurity in Madagascar (Blanc-Pamard and Rakoto 
Ramiarantsoa, 2000; Sandron, 2008; Bellemare, 2009). 
 
6. Conclusion 
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This paper has studied the effect of de jure and de facto land rights on agricultural productivity 
in rural Madagascar and has contributed to the literature on the impacts of property rights by 
improving upon the identification of their effects via the use of precise soil quality measurements 
to control for the unobserved heterogeneity between plots.  
 
While de jure land rights − land titles − have no impact on agricultural productivity once one 
controls for the unobservable heterogeneity between villages, households, and plots, de facto 
land rights – whether one has the right to build a tomb on it, lease it out, or build a tomb on it; 
and transfer rights − have heterogeneous impacts on agricultural productivity. The right to plant 
trees on a plot has a positive impact on agricultural productivity, but the right to build a tomb on 
it, the right to lease it out, and whether one has transfer rights on it have negative impacts on 
productivity. In addition, the right to lease out implies that the landowner will be more likely to 
want to title the plot and willing to pay more to get the plot titled while landowners whose 
children will have the exact same rights on the plots are willing to pay less to get the plot titled. 
Finally, neither de jure nor de facto land rights have any impact on the landowner’s subjective 
assessment of the value of her plot. 
 
Because many landowners have not kept their land titles up to date, it is not surprising that 
land titles should have no impact on agricultural productivity in this context, and the empirics 
point to an institutional failure at a level above and beyond that of the community. As for the 
impacts of de facto land rights, one can only speculate as to the causal mechanisms through 
which these rights impact productivity and, as such, the investigation of these causal mechanisms 
is better left for future research, although an informal test has shown that landowners whose 
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households include more elderly people, and who thus expect to have to build a tomb sooner 
than others, are less productive on plots on which they have the right to build a tomb. More 
rigorous tests of the various hypotheses discussed above for why certain rights are associated 
with a decrease in productivity are beyond the scope of this paper given data limitations but 
should offer a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
In terms of policy, the empirical results in this paper suggest that any land titling effort will 
have no impact on productivity if it is not accompanied by an overhaul of the institutions in 
charge of the administration of lands. It looks as though a possible policy solution would be for 
the central government to both decentralize the administration of plots at the commune level and 
formalize the small papers system, which in itself constitutes an informal albeit innovative policy 
response to an important institutional failure. A land reform was undertaken starting in 2005, but 
it is unclear yet whether it may have been affected by the political events of early 2009. 
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Figure 1. Kernel density estimation of rice yield distributions by titling status with Epanechnikov 
kernel and bandwidth set equal to 15. 
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (n=473) 
Variable Coefficient (Std. Dev.) 
Yield (Kg/Are) 37.427 (27.734) 
Cultivated Area (Ares) 16.433 (19.134) 
Soil Quality Measurements 
  Carbon (Percent) 2.403 (1.079) 
Nitrogen (Percent) 0.213 (0.090) 
Soil pH 5.069 (0.306) 
Potassium (Percent) 0.206 (0.068) 
Clay (Percent) 28.210 (3.651) 
Silt (Percent) 26.409 (6.408) 
Sand (Percent 45.134 (8.034) 
Observable Plot Characteristics 
  Crop Disease Dummy 0.186 (0.390) 
Distance from House (Walking Minutes) 10.289 (10.774) 
Black Soil Dummy 0.505 (0.501) 
Red Soil Dummy 0.184 (0.388) 
Brown or White Soil Dummy 0.311 (0.463) 
Lowland Plot Dummy 0.619 (0.486) 
Hilltop Plot Dummy 0.027 (0.164) 
Hillside Plot Dummy 0.353 (0.478) 
Irrigated by Rain Dummy 0.152 (0.360) 
Irrigated by Dam Dummy 0.450 (0.498) 
Irrigated by Spring Dummy 0.372 (0.484) 
Land Rights 
  Right to Sell Dummy 0.564 (0.496) 
Right to Build a Tomb Dummy 0.152 (0.360) 
Right to Lease Out Dummy 0.723 (0.448) 
Right to Plant Trees Dummy 0.516 (0.500) 
Kids Will Have the Same Rights Dummy 0.459 (0.499) 
Inherited Plot Dummy 0.643 (0.480) 
Purchased Plot Dummy 0.319 (0.467) 
Plot Received as Gift Dummy 0.006 (0.079) 
Plot Obtained Through Clearing Dummy 0.023 (0.151) 
Formal Title Dummy 0.323 (0.468) 
Intent and WTP to Title (n=320) 
  Intent to Title the Plot Dummy 0.491 (0.501) 
WTP to Title the Plot (Ar/Are) 870.929 (3433.337) 
Plot Value (n=462) 
  Plot Value (Ar/Are) 50870.160 (54226.920) 
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Table 2. De Facto and de Jure Land Rights 
  Untitled Plots (n=320) Titled Plots (n=153)   
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) Mean Std. Dev. Difference 
Disaggregated Land Rights Measures 
     Right to Sell Dummy 0.609 (0.489) 0.471 (0.501) *** 
Children Will Have Same Rights Dummy 0.397 (0.490) 0.588 (0.494) *** 
Right to Build a Tomb Dummy 0.181 (0.386) 0.092 (0.289) *** 
Right to Lease Out Dummy 0.719 (0.450) 0.732 (0.444) 
 Right to Plant Trees Dummy 0.531 (0.500) 0.484 (0.501) 
 Aggregated Land Rights Measures 
     Use Rights Dummy 0.538 (0.499) 0.497 (0.502) 
 Transfer Rights Dummy 0.831 (0.375) 0.922 (0.270) *** 
Count of Rights 2.438 (1.439) 2.366 (1.213) 
 Any Rights Dummy 0.853 (0.355) 0.954 (0.210) *** 
Mode of Acquisition 
     Inherited Plot Dummy 0.609 (0.489) 0.712 (0.454) ** 
Purchased Plot Dummy 0.356 (0.480) 0.242 (0.430) *** 
Plot Received as Gift Dummy 0.000 (0.000) 0.020 (0.139) ** 
Plot Obtained Through Clearing Dummy 0.022 (0.147) 0.026 (0.160)   
Rice Yield 
     Mean 38.523 (1.661) 35.136 (1.858) 
 Variance 880.749 (143.694) 530.752 (84.212) * 
The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Agricultural Productivity: OLS with Household Fixed Effects and Disaggregated de Facto Rights 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Rice Yield (Kg/Are) 
Formal Title -0.064 
 
(0.240) 0.028 
 
(0.174) 0.001 
 
(0.171) 
Right to Sell 
         Right to Lease Out 
         Rights of Children Identical 
         Right to Plant Trees 
         Right to Build a Tomb 
         Cultivated Area 
   
-0.228 *** (0.066) -0.224 *** (0.070) 
Crop Disease 
   
-0.050 
 
(0.147) -0.086 
 
(0.145) 
Distance from House 
   
-0.005 
 
(0.004) -0.005 
 
(0.006) 
Red Soil 
   
-0.048 
 
(0.248) -0.017 
 
(0.244) 
Brown or White Soil 
   
0.167 
 
(0.188) 0.241 
 
(0.151) 
Hilltop Plot 
   
-0.343 
 
(0.224) -0.607 * (0.368) 
Hillside Plot 
   
-0.105 
 
(0.163) -0.186 
 
(0.164) 
Irrigated by Dam 
   
0.310 
 
(0.197) 0.395 * (0.208) 
Irrigated by Spring 
   
0.344 * (0.191) 0.414 * (0.213) 
Carbon 
      
-0.298 
 
(3.195) 
Nitrogen 
      
0.494 
 
(3.277) 
Soil pH 
      
-14.957 
 
(16.257) 
Potassium 
      
-6.656 * (3.412) 
Clay 
      
-4.368 
 
(4.581) 
Silt 
      
-1.142 
 
(15.458) 
Sand 
      
10.000 
 
(9.194) 
Intercept 3.408 
 
(0.078) 3.682   (0.264) 3.515 
 
(1.268) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 
Number of Households 290 290 290 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.79 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.96 0.97 0.97 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level 
everywhere. 
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Table 3. Estimation Results for Agricultural Productivity: OLS with Household Fixed Effects and Disaggregated de Facto Rights (Continued) 
  (4) (5) (6) 
 Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Formal Title -0.104 
 
(0.154) -0.138 
 
(0.175) 0.666 
 
(0.708) 
Right to Sell 0.098 
 
(0.201) 0.076 
 
(0.283) 0.235 
 
(0.242) 
Right to Lease Out -0.744 ** (0.272) -0.713 ** (0.319) -0.523 
 
(0.366) 
Rights of Children Identical 0.144 
 
(0.144) 0.144 
 
(0.304) 0.216 
 
(0.376) 
Right to Plant Trees 0.760 ** (0.284) 0.784 * (0.445) 0.451 
 
(0.471) 
Right to Build a Tomb -0.580 
 
(0.353) -0.818 * (0.447) -0.495 
 
(0.323) 
Log of Plot Size -0.220 *** (0.066) -0.213 *** (0.069) -0.230 *** (0.053) 
Crop Disease -0.047 
 
(0.155) -0.092 
 
(0.150) 0.006 
 
(0.143) 
Distance from House -0.005 
 
(0.004) -0.004 
 
(0.007) -0.005 
 
(0.006) 
Red Soil -0.051 
 
(0.225) -0.001 
 
(0.206) -0.003 
 
(0.150) 
Brown or White Soil 0.167 
 
(0.181) 0.256 * (0.142) 0.125 
 
(0.122) 
Hilltop Plot -0.132 
 
(0.260) -0.428 
 
(0.353) -0.274 
 
(0.350) 
Hillside Plot -0.106 
 
(0.160) -0.184 
 
(0.163) -0.095 
 
(0.117) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.231 
 
(0.168) 0.305 * (0.183) 0.405 * (0.226) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.275 
 
(0.183) 0.330 
 
(0.204) 0.419 * (0.215) 
Carbon 
   
-0.292 
 
(3.122) 
   Nitrogen 
   
0.143 
 
(3.178) 
   Soil pH 
   
-28.728 ** (13.900) 
   Potassium 
   
-7.854 ** (3.193) 
   Clay 
   
-4.215 
 
(4.663) 
   Silt 
   
12.342 
 
(13.122) 
   Sand 
   
11.514 
 
(9.149) 
   Intercept 3.881 * (0.364) 3.823   (1.158) 3.386   (0.553) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 
Number of Households 290 290 290 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Weak Instrument) - - 11.18 
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 
 Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level 
everywhere except in column 6. 
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Table 4. Estimation Results for Agricultural Productivity: OLS with Household Fixed Effects and Use and Transfer de Facto Rights 
  4' 5' 6' 
 Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Formal Title 0.027 
 
(0.156) 0.004 
 
(0.156) 0.247 
 
(0.413) 
Use Rights 0.439 * (0.218) 0.363 
 
(0.287) 0.433 
 
(0.294) 
Transfer Rights -0.551 ** (0.202) -0.487 * (0.260) -0.553 ** (0.282) 
Log of Plot Size -0.227 *** (0.065) -0.225 *** (0.069) -0.230 *** (0.050) 
Crop Disease -0.052 
 
(0.145) -0.087 
 
(0.147) -0.040 
 
(0.130) 
Distance from House -0.006 
 
(0.004) -0.006 
 
(0.006) -0.006 
 
(0.006) 
Red Soil -0.070 
 
(0.244) -0.036 
 
(0.245) -0.054 
 
(0.139) 
Brown or White Soil 0.147 
 
(0.191) 0.220 
 
(0.156) 0.134 
 
(0.114) 
Hilltop Plot -0.326 
 
(0.221) -0.578 * (0.350) -0.369 
 
(0.309) 
Hillside Plot -0.120 
 
(0.157) -0.196 
 
(0.161) -0.119 
 
(0.111) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.347 
 
(0.199) 0.425 ** (0.210) 0.390 ** (0.171) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.365 * (0.201) 0.431 ** (0.223) 0.399 * (0.172) 
Carbon 
   
-0.208 
 
(3.093) 
   Nitrogen 
   
0.414 
 
(3.220) 
   Soil pH 
   
-14.037 
 
(16.283) 
   Potassium 
   
-6.643 ** (3.355) 
   Clay 
   
-4.204 
 
(4.477) 
   Silt 
   
-1.788 
 
(15.152) 
   Sand 
   
9.953 
 
(8.884) 
   Intercept 3.930 * (0.393) 3.745   (1.317) 3.836   (0.352) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 
Number of Households 290 290 290 
Bootstrap Replications - 500 - 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.03 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Weak Instrument) - - 29.00 
R2 0.96 0.97 0.97 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level 
everywhere except in column 6’. 
 
  
43 
 
Table 5. Estimation Results for Agricultural Productivity: OLS with Household Fixed Effects and Count of de Facto Rights 
  4'' 5'' 6'' 
 Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Formal Title -0.014 
 
(0.167) -0.046 
 
(0.159) 0.309 
 
(0.600) 
Count of de Facto Rights -0.071 
 
(0.062) -0.079 
 
(0.066) -0.035 
 
(0.097) 
Log of Plot Size -0.228 *** (0.063) -0.224 *** (0.067) -0.231 *** (0.051) 
Crop Disease -0.061 
 
(0.144) -0.101 
 
(0.146) -0.038 
 
(0.136) 
Distance from House -0.004 
 
(0.004) -0.004 
 
(0.007) -0.005 
 
(0.006) 
Red Soil -0.025 
 
(0.239) 0.010 
 
(0.233) -0.016 
 
(0.138) 
Brown or White Soil 0.177 
 
(0.188) 0.254 * (0.149) 0.155 
 
(0.120) 
Hilltop Plot -0.343 
 
(0.209) -0.615 * (0.367) -0.403 
 
(0.321) 
Hillside Plot -0.103 
 
(0.162) -0.184 
 
(0.165) -0.103 
 
(0.112) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.281 
 
(0.205) 0.365 * (0.217) 0.356 * (0.206) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.317 
 
(0.204) 0.386 * (0.225) 0.377 ** (0.197) 
Carbon 
   
-0.306 
 
(3.185) 
   Nitrogen 
   
0.451 
 
(3.282) 
   Soil pH 
   
-16.369 
 
(15.934) 
   Potassium 
   
-6.829 ** (3.450) 
   Clay 
   
-4.119 
 
(4.593) 
   Silt 
   
0.595 
 
(14.980) 
   Sand 
   
10.671 
 
(9.191) 
   Intercept 3.879   (0.384) 3.739   (1.240) 3.643   (0.509) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 
Number of Households 290 290 290 
Bootstrap Replications - 500 - 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.04 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Weak Instrument) - - 14.03 
R2 0.96 0.97 0.97 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level 
everywhere except in column 6’’.  
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Table 6. Estimation Results for Agricultural Productivity: OLS with Household Fixed Effects and a Dummy for Whether the Landowner Has Any de Facto Right on the Plot 
  4''' 5''' 6''' 
 Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Formal Title 0.027 
 
(0.177) -0.002 
 
(0.177) 0.387 
 
(0.394) 
Any de Facto Right 0.017 
 
(0.256) 0.049 
 
(0.307) -0.118 
 
(0.411) 
Log of Plot Size -0.228 *** (0.067) -0.224 *** (0.072) -0.233 *** (0.052) 
Crop Disease -0.050 
 
(0.148) -0.084 
 
(0.148) -0.035 
 
(0.132) 
Distance from House -0.005 
 
(0.004) -0.005 
 
(0.006) -0.005 
 
(0.006) 
Red Soil -0.049 
 
(0.245) -0.019 
 
(0.245) -0.021 
 
(0.139) 
Brown or White Soil 0.167 
 
(0.188) 0.241 
 
(0.151) 0.147 
 
(0.115) 
Hilltop Plot -0.343 
 
(0.219) -0.606 * (0.366) -0.417 
 
(0.314) 
Hillside Plot -0.105 
 
(0.162) -0.185 
 
(0.164) -0.105 
 
(0.113) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.310 
 
(0.198) 0.396 ** (0.209) 0.377 ** (0.169) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.344 * (0.192) 0.415 ** (0.215) 0.397 ** (0.172) 
Carbon 
   
-0.314 
 
(3.193) 
   Nitrogen 
   
0.518 
 
(3.259) 
   Soil pH 
   
-14.972 
 
(16.541) 
   Potassium 
   
-6.658 * (3.421) 
   Clay 
   
-4.364 
 
(4.636) 
   Silt 
   
-1.202 
 
(15.702) 
   Sand 
   
9.980 
 
(9.314) 
   Intercept 3.667   (0.430) 3.470   (1.334) 3.633   (0.411) 
Number of Observations 473 473 473 
Number of Households 290 290 290 
Bootstrap Replications - 500 - 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Weak Instrument) - - 35.06 
R2 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are clustered at the village level 
everywhere except in column 6’’’. 
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Table 7. OLS and IV with Household Fixed Effects Estimation Results for Land Value 
  OLS IV 
 Variable  Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Dependent Variable: Log of Land Value (Ariary/Are) 
Formal Title -0.065 
 
(0.156) 1.032 
 
(0.758) 
Right to Sell -0.235 
 
(0.351) -0.028 
 
(0.259) 
Right to Lease Out 0.053 
 
(0.399) 0.342 
 
(0.392) 
Children Will Have Same Rights 0.016 
 
(0.214) 0.135 
 
(0.402) 
Right to Plant Trees 0.068 
 
(0.355) -0.353 
 
(0.507) 
Right to Build a Tomb -0.330 
 
(0.440) -0.167 
 
(0.346) 
Cultivated Area -0.210 *** (0.080) -0.221 *** (0.058) 
Crop Disease 0.173 
 
(0.176) 0.277 * (0.157) 
Distance from House 0.000 
 
(0.007) 0.002 
 
(0.007) 
Red Soil 0.154 
 
(0.151) 0.193 
 
(0.166) 
Brown or White Soil 0.251 
 
(0.164) 0.144 
 
(0.133) 
Hilltop Plot -0.959 * (0.492) -1.071 *** (0.374) 
Hillside Plot -0.320 ** (0.125) -0.251 ** (0.130) 
Irrigated by Dam 0.261 
 
(0.196) 0.472 * (0.244) 
Irrigated by Spring 0.283 
 
(0.198) 0.460 ** (0.229) 
Carbon 0.401 
 
(4.027) 
   Nitrogen -0.939 
 
(3.981) 
   Potassium -2.760 
 
(18.802) 
   Soil pH -3.452 
 
(5.025) 
   Clay -1.114 
 
(8.073) 
   Silt -1.734 
 
(12.695) 
   Sand 10.670 
 
(13.170) 
   Intercept 10.597 *** (1.250) 10.031 *** (0.580) 
Number of Observations 462 462 
Number of Households 284 284 
Bootstrap Replications 500 - 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 
F-statistic (Weak Instrument) - 11.18 
R2 0.93 0.91 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level everywhere except in the second column. The estimation includes only 462 observations 
instead of 473 because of missing plot values. 
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Table 8. OLS with Household Fixed Effects Estimation Results for Intent and WTP to Title 
 Dependent Variable: Intent to Title WTP to Title 
 
( = 1 if Landowner Intends to 
Seek a Title; = 0 Otherwise.) 
(Log of WTP in Ariary/Are) 
 
 Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
Right to Sell 0.028 
 
(0.250) 0.623 
 
(3.996) 
Right to Lease Out 0.808 ** (0.397) 12.782 * (6.486) 
Children Will Have Same Rights -0.130 * (0.071) -2.509 ** (1.207) 
Right to Plant Trees -0.509 
 
(0.428) -7.223 
 
(7.260) 
Right to Build a Tomb 0.360 
 
(0.392) 4.558 
 
(6.665) 
Plot Purchased 0.024 
 
(0.042) 0.502 
 
(0.702) 
Plot Received as Gift (Dropped) 
  
(Dropped) 
  Plot Obtained Through Clearing -0.150 
 
(0.301) -0.639 
 
(4.892) 
Cultivated Area 0.020 
 
(0.033) -0.428 
 
(0.552) 
Crop Disease 0.000 
 
(0.074) -0.289 
 
(1.218) 
Distance from House 0.001 
 
(0.003) 0.021 
 
(0.045) 
Red Soil -0.003 
 
(0.066) 0.063 
 
(1.077) 
Brown or White Soil -0.014 
 
(0.037) -0.298 
 
(0.622) 
Hilltop Plot (Dropped) 
  
(Dropped) 
  Hillside Plot 0.051 
 
(0.036) 0.788 
 
(0.536) 
Irrigated by Dam -0.107 
 
(0.126) -1.197 
 
(2.047) 
Irrigated by Spring -0.105 
 
(0.138) -1.245 
 
(2.184) 
Plot Value -0.009 
 
(0.052) -0.007 
 
(0.825) 
Carbon 0.394 
 
(1.306) 4.395 
 
(19.941) 
Nitrogen 0.166 
 
(1.686) 4.951 
 
(27.294) 
Potassium -0.492 
 
(2.311) -4.689 
 
(35.918) 
Soil pH 6.938 
 
(9.639) 118.752 
 
(153.844) 
Clay 2.672 
 
(3.002) 40.064 
 
(46.364) 
Silt -8.314 
 
(10.578) -143.341 
 
(176.953) 
Sand 2.533 
 
(5.000) 36.342 
 
(79.579) 
Intercept 0.221   (1.261) -6.532   (20.972) 
Number of Observations 316 316 
Number of Households 195 195 
Bootstrap Replications 500 500 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 0.00 
R2 0.93 0.93 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
clustered at the village level everywhere except in column 6. The estimation includes only 316 observations instead of 
473 because titled plots are omitted from these estimation results given the dependent variables.  
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Table A1. OLS Regressions of Soil Characteristics Established by Wet Chemistry on Principal Components Derived from Spectral Data (n=234) 
Variable Carbon Nitrogen Potassium pH Clay Silt Sand 
Principal Component 1 -21.866 -1.61 -0.809 77.237 -17.844 0.411 -62.696 
 
(3.630) (0.308) (0.708) (27.731) (34.451) (1.809) (40.802) 
Principal Component 2 34.244 3.2 -0.058 -147.601 92.245 12.092 55.525 
  (6.167) (0.523) (1.218) (47.572) (59.100) (3.103) (69.996) 
Number of Soil Samples 234 234 234 234 234 234 234 
Village Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.88 0.89 0.57 0.94 0.90 0.99 0.37 
Note: This table is reproduced from Barrett et al. (2010). Standard errors are in parentheses. The results of these regressions are used to impute the values of 
the dependent variables (i.e., carbon, nitrogen, potassium, pH, clay, silt, and sand) for the entire sample of plots. 
 
 
